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This paper contributes to the debates around food and nutrition security from a 
perspective of gender justice, central to which is the recognition of men and women 
as having equal rights and entitlements to a life free from hunger and malnutrition.  
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Introduction 
 
Despite sustained economic growth over the last decade, a sixth of India’s 
population and a fifth of its children remain undernourished (IFPRI, 2017). Since 
2000, global attention has been focused on food security and nutrition, first through 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and now through Goal 2 of the 
Sustainable Development Agenda. Indian policy-makers recognise freedom from 
hunger as a basic human right, and acknowledge the significant role of women in 
ensuring household food security. The National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013 
formalises this recognition by legitimising the senior most woman in the household 
as its ‘head’ for securing food entitlements. 1 This is indeed a welcome step, but it 
also brings forth the need to better understand the linkages between the recognition 
of women in food security policies, gender relations on the ground, and outcomes 
related to food and nutrition security.  
 
In this paper, we first set out the multi-dimensional nature of food security and 
nutrition from the perspective of gender justice.  Invoking of gender justice brings to 
attention the gender power dynamics across a range of areas from resource access 
and control to the feminization of agriculture, women’s unpaid domestic and care 
work, wage gaps, and the nature of social protection and rights legislation. These 
vary across caste and ethnicity, class and religion, as women, and for that matter 
men, are not a homogenous group, rather they are embedded in a web of complex 
social relations.  Among the poorest and asset less, gender relations are often more 
equitable and resources shared, as unless both spouses cooperate, survival itself may 
be threatened (Swaminathan et al. 2011). Yet, women in these groups, lacking in 
assets and social networks, are often excluded from state entitlements (Author 2008), 
including institutional credit (Prakash, 2010) and public extension services (Birner 
and Anderson, 2007).  We focus here on one element i.e. food based social safety net 
                                                     
1 http://dfpd.nic.in/Salient-features-National-Food-Security-Act.htm 
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programmes, to explore these dynamics. We analyse the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), the largest food subsidy programme in the world.      
 
In section 1, we conceptualise our understanding of gender justice in relation to food 
security. Section 2 sets out the data used and context of the study, Section 3 analyses 
key elements of gender power dynamics in relation to one of the three pillars of food 
security, namely, the economic and social access to food.2 In section 4, we provide 
some conclusions and possible implications for research and policy. 
 
Section 1: Framing the debate 
1.1 What does gender justice in food security policies mean? 
 
The commitment to food and nutrition security adopted at the World Food Summit 
(FAO, 1996), articulates the need for gender equality and women’s empowerment, in 
line with the Beijing Platform for Action, 1995. It supports the equal participation of 
men and women by ensuring equal access to productive assets (land, water, credit), 
technologies and services. Nevertheless, it falls short of the goals of gender justice, 
by ignoring the reality of unequal gender relations, divisions of labour, and social 
normative expectations, across societies.  
 
An alternate conceptualisation of ‘gender-just’ food and nutrition security would not 
only mean “a world without hunger, where women, men, girls and boys have equal 
access to nutritious, healthy food” (BRIDGE 2015), but equally have access to the 
means to produce, sell and purchase food. There is a larger dimension of gender 
justice as well, which includes “a world free of gender-based violence, where the 
roles, responsibilities, opportunities and choices available to women and men – 
including unpaid caregiving and food provision – are not predetermined at birth but 
                                                     
2 The other two pillars are food availability (through adequate food production), and utilization and 
stability (nutrition security) (FAO, 1996). 
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can, where possible, be developed in line with individual capacities and aspirations” 
(Ibid.).  
 
There are three elements to this larger vision of gender justice. First, the concept of 
‘justice’ implies an entitlement backed by law, a right rather than a welfare support 
to ‘beneficiaries’ at the State’s discretion. Entitlements are based on alternate 
ideologies and justifications of what is fair in terms of resource allocation – should it 
be the “pursuit of human fulfilment, or removal of poverty, or entitlement to enjoy 
the products of one’s own labour” (Sen, 2009:14). Each of these justifications would 
point to a different social arrangement, enabled through different incentives and 
social institutions.  
 
In India, over the past decade, in response to grassroots mobilisation and advocacy, 
the state has increasingly moved away from a welfarist (needs-based) approach, 
which involved large exclusion and inclusion biases (Deaton and Dreze, 2002), to 
creating a rights-based framework for entitlements. This is important for ensuring 
the dignity of human beings, their right to live a healthy and fulfilling life, as 
deprivation is often a result of discrimination across generations, rather than an 
individual flaw (Thorat and Sadana 2009). In this sense, the National Food Security 
Act (NFSA), 2013, at least in ideological terms, replaces relations of patronage with a 
legitimate claim or right of citizens. 
 
Food constitutes the basic element for a functioning life, hence access to food cannot 
and should not be mediated through social hierarchies and identities. Yet as Ribot 
and Peluso (2003: 153) note, the idea of access as “the ability to derive benefits from 
things,” broadening from the classical definition as “the right to benefit from 
things”, suggests that access is more akin to “a bundle of powers” than to property’s 
notion of a “bundle of rights”. This formulation, the authors maintain, consists of a 
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wider range of social relationships (like gender, caste, class, local power) that 
constrain or enable benefits from resource use.  
 
Second, the perspective of gender justice recognises that gender-based violence is a 
tool of control within patriarchy, and a mechanism for wider social control, 
including of the poor, lower castes and tribes in the case of India. While food 
deprivation itself can be considered a form of violence, hunger and food insecurity 
can also aggravate other forms of violence, including early marriage, trafficking of 
young girls and intimate partner violence, especially in times of crisis. Unpacking 
the gendered nature of decision-making and resource allocation at various levels, to 
reveal the trade-offs between short-term wellbeing and investments in future 
security, could indicate the nature and scale of injustices that need to be challenged 
in order to transform relations of dependence that perpetuate such violence.  
 
Third, the problem of food insecurity is multi-dimensional and interconnected; it 
involves food but equally broader visions of wellbeing and freedoms (Sen 1999). The 
persistent discrimination of the poor, Scheduled castes and tribes in India, and 
women within these groups, often leads to their engagement with forms of work 
that are low-paid, insecure and risky, for the sake of survival, rather than an 
enhanced sense of choice or wellbeing (Author, 2014).  Interestingly, 2005 was a 
watershed year with the passage of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), which transformed decent work into a 
right. The same year witnessed an amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, 
providing daughters equal rights to inherit property as sons, and the Prevention of 
Domestic Violence Act, to protect women from domestic abuse – both central to 
ensuring gender justice. Just as the lack of assets, land, in a rural context, can 
enhance women’s vulnerability, gender based violence can undermine women’s 
rights, impeding access to the public sphere and in turn access to food. Unequal 
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power relations based on gender or social identity, here dictate unequal relations to 
resources, claims and responsibilities (Kabeer, 1994). 
Though a significant strand of literature analyses the links between gender justice 
and food and nutrition security by exploring the domain of production, namely, 
addressing the ‘resource gaps’ women confront in agriculture (FAO, 2011), we focus 
on the access to food through state transfers, here the Indian Public Distribution 
System (PDS). From a gender justice perspective, we examine issues of access, 
entitlement and the quality of service delivery for differently positioned women. We 
focus on rural areas in the state of Bihar (East India), one of the poorest in the 
country. 
 
1.2 Food Entitlements and The Public Distribution System in India 
Given the burden of hunger and malnutrition, the Public Distribution System (PDS) 
for food can play a key role in ensuring access to food for the poor and in mitigating 
the impact of shocks, both natural (drought, flood) and market-based (price 
fluctuations, shortages). PDS is one of the most extensive social safety net 
programmes in the world, distributing food grains to about 160 million people every 
year using 400,000 Fair Price Shops (FPS) (Dreze and Khera 2013). In Bihar, PDS 
currently provides two main cereals viz. rice and wheat and supplies sugar.  While 
plagued with significant leakages and corruption in the past, the PDS in Bihar 
appears to have turned a corner with leakages plummeting from over 70 percent to 
only 24 percent currently (Dreze and Khera 2013). The drivers for this turnaround 
remain to be rigorously researched and established. 
 
Entitlements to food can be accessed through production, market exchange, or state 
provisioning (Sen, 1981). In focusing on state transfers in this paper, two issues need 
consideration: the quality of rights and the mechanisms for their enforcement. As per 
the NFSA (2013), nearly two thirds of the population – 75 per cent rural and 50 per 
7 
 
cent urban - are entitled to food grains at subsidised rates. Each household is 
provided a ration card, and depending on their economic status, the price of the 
grain is fixed.  While before the NFSA, households were classified into three 
categories, namely, Above Poverty Line (APL), Below Poverty Line (BPL) and 
poorest of the poor-Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), there are now two main categories 
of entitlement-holders: Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) households or the poorest of the 
poor; and Priority Households (PHH), who hold BPL (Below Poverty Line) or NFS 
cards. Foodgrains entitlement are 5 kg per person for PHH category and 35 kg per 
household for AAY households; prices are fixed at INR 3/2/1 per kg for rice, wheat 
and coarse grains respectively. 
 
Since the implementation was not fully completed in Bihar at the time of data 
collection, not all households had cards under NFSA; some still possess the earlier 
BPL and APL cards. To ease the implementation challenges, the PDS shops are 
directed to accept any type of ration card. In our sample (Table 2) nearly 98.6 % are 
ration card holders (ration card is a union of any of the sub types of card), of which 
47.3% are BPL card holders, AAY card holders account for nearly 15%, while 35% 
are NFS card holders (PHH). 
 
While a universal entitlement, the workings of social and economic hierarchies based 
on gender, caste and class are visible on both the supply and demand sides 
(Deshpande, 2002). If women, particularly from the lower castes, confront 
discrimination, they may decide to self-select out of the PDS to maintain their 
dignity. Alternatively, in the absence of commensurate policy and institutional 
responses, and grievance redressal systems, there could be an informal screening, 
with some households, comprising women, who are economically and politically 
less powerful, denied access.  
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Even without selection or screening, social identity as reflected in the intersections of 
gender, caste and class, could bear on the intensity of engagement with the PDS as 
well as the quality of services rendered. Quality of services comprise entitlement 
snatching (less quantities provided than entitled) or price magnification (charging of 
prices higher than government mandated). Even if the prices charged and the 
quantities disbursed were adequate, there are ways in which some groups could 
receive suboptimal services from the PDS, in terms of the quality of grains or the 
general service experience of waiting time, harassment or just lack of treatment with 
dignity (Grace Carswell personal communication). Thorat and Lee (2006) note that 
women, especially of the lower castes are often prohibited from participation, if not 
actively discriminated against. In their five village study, they cite four forms of 
“discriminatory practices” against the Dalits (lower caste) – “discrimination in 
quantity, discrimination in price, caste-based favouritism by the PDS dealer, and 
practices of “untouchability” by the PDS dealer” (Ibid: 4200). 
 
Fair Price Shops (FPS) are the last node of delivery and most outcomes are a function 
of the interactions between women entitlement-holders and the PDS dealer.3 These 
relations are mediated through the social identity of the claimant, the social 
networks and power structures within the village community, the leadership and 
functioning of the local government (panchayats), and the responsibilities of state 
functionaries.  The precedence of informal rules at this stage reproduce the existing, 
unequal social and economic power structures, affecting fair allocation of benefits 
through the PDS, and in turn compromising citizen rights and entitlements. 
 
The PDS is visualised as a tool for improving the wellbeing of the poor and 
vulnerable in multiple ways. Apart from ensuring minimum food (calories) to all 
                                                     
3 "Fair price shop" means a shop which has been licensed to distribute essential commodities by an 
order issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to the ration card holders under 
the Public Distribution System. (National Food Security Act (2013, Chapter 1) 
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citizens, it bears on the multiplicity of tasks performed primarily by women within 
households, such as having to go to distant markets to buy food, alongside food 
processing and preparation. At the same time, poor delivery could threaten 
wellbeing. For example, low quality grains would imply adding to women’s work 
burdens (clean, sort and cook the often substandard PDS rice), and care tasks 
(looking after sick children), a very important element of gender justice. While the 
social construct of gender, and its interactions with caste and class, shape women’s 
bargaining power within the household and beyond, in the interlinked institutional 
arenas of the market, the community and the state (Agarwal, 1997, Kabeer, 1994), we 
try to highlight the contradictions and injustices that need to be overcome in 
accessing entitlements. We seek to capture this complexity of relationships through a 
focus on labour time and social interactions in relation to the PDS. 
 
Section 2:  Data and Context 
The data for this study has been collected from extensive field-work in Bihar, 
involving both quantitative as well as qualitative methods, between February to June 
2016. Bihar offers significant variation in the functioning of the PDS and contrasting 
experiences across districts, and villages (Table 1).  The quantitative data was 
collected through a structured questionnaire in 32 villages across five districts – 
Patna, Darbhanga, Banka, Munger and West Champaran, with information on socio-
economic and demographic characteristics, and current and prospective engagement 
with the PDS. The survey also provides information on the purchases of rice and 
wheat and issues of access to the PDS. The qualitative data used in this paper was 
collected through interviews and observations in three villages in Patna district. The 
respondents were household members who had experience of the PDS, and were 
generally women, especially as Patna district has a high incidence of male migration. 
 
Table 1: District-wise basic information 
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 Population 
Density (Sq Km) 
Urban 
Population 
Rural 
Population 
Literacy Sex 
Ratio 
Patna 1800 43.7 56.3 73.68 897 
Darbhanga 1700 8.7 91.3 58.26 910 
Banka 670 3.51 96.49 60.12 907 
Munger 960 16.59 83.41 73.3 879 
West Champaran 750 10.09 89.91 58.06 906 
Source: NSSO data 
 
The average size of landholding ranges from 0.31 hectare in Darbhanga to 0.45 in 
Banka. Though agriculture and livestock-rearing constitute the main economic 
activity in the region, many households seek employment in the non-farm sector. 
The houses in these villages are a combination of both pucca (solid and permanent) 
and semi-pucca houses. The social structure is highly patriarchal and male-
dominated as revealed by the low sex ratios. 
 
2.1 Sample Composition: 
Table 2 presents the sample composition in terms of socio-economic characteristics. 
There are five main social groups in the field site: Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled 
Tribes (ST), Other Backward Classes (OBC), Minorities and Upper/General Caste. 
These are administrative categories; social identity on the ground is defined more at 
the sub caste or clan level. OBCs at 55 percent formed the majority, and included 
groups such as the Yadavs and Mauryas. They were followed by the SCs (Chamars, 
Mochi, Dhobi, Dusadh) at 20 per cent, STs at 12 per cent and general or upper castes 
(including the land-owning Bhumihars, Rajputs, Brahmins) forming 11 percent. In this 
paper, we mainly focus on the relationship between the Bhumihars, Yadavs and SCs.  
 
Table 2: Sample Composition 
Bihar 
Sample Size 962 
Age of the respondent 48.26 
Household size 6.12 
Female (%) 29.52 
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Percentage of respondent belonging to 
Scheduled caste 19.85 
Scheduled tribe 12.16 
Other Backward caste 55.41 
Minorities 1.87 
Upper caste/upper caste 10.71 
Percentage of respondents who 
No School 53.06 
Primary School 17.72 
Middle School 12.97 
High School 10.13 
Intermediate 3.16 
Bachelors and above 2.96 
Percentage of respondents who 
Have migrants (%) 27.01 
BPL Card holder (%) 47.3 
AAY Card holder (%) 14.66 
NFS Card holder (PHH) % 35.24 
Ration Card Holder (%) 98.69 
FPS availability in their village (%) 72.74 
Aadhar Card holder (%) 74.69 
Bank Account (%) 78.88 
Aadhar is a 12-digit unique identification number issued by the Indian government to every resident of India.  
 
Family size and structure has a direct relationship with food entitlements as 
household allocations (for households other than the poorest of the poor (AAY)) are 
defined in per capita terms. The average family size therefore shapes the entitlement 
as well as engagement with the PDS. Extensive male migration has further led to 
almost 35 percent households becoming de facto female-headed (FHHs). They often 
face covert forms of discrimination when accessing the PDS as discussed next.  
 
Within the sample, there are significant differences based on caste, gender, economic 
standing and political connectedness. Land is an important source of economic and 
political power for rural households. Nearly 52 per cent of households’ primary 
source of income is wage labour. This heterogeneity is important where landlessness 
or small landholdings result in a greater stake in the PDS. In this context, the 
inheritance laws that de facto restrict land ownership for women deny them an 
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important source of local power, reflected in lower levels of access, and indeed 
bargaining power. 
 
2.2 Eligibility for services 
With significant heterogeneity in effective dependence on the PDS, the question 
arises who can avail of the benefits, particularly with attributes that can be 
considered gender just.  One of the most basic determinants of access is possession 
of a ration card, i.e. entitlement to food subsidy. Households may not possess a 
ration card because of different socio-political-economic factors. This was evident 
from the case of a 75-year-old SC woman. Since her late husband was against the 
upper caste Mukhiya (village headman), she was denied all benefits – the ration card 
and pension included.  
 
The ward members and the Mukhiya himself admitted that they had purposefully 
cut off her name from the beneficiary list since her late husband was against their 
faction. The ability to deny or delay cards that protect entitlements, plays a key role 
in local power relations and can affect women negatively in the given patriarchal 
social context. They end up waiting, queueing and begging, constructed as 
dependent clients of the welfare state, rather than rights-bearing citizens (Fraser, 
1989, Carswell, 2018. personal comm.), their labour time devalued and dignity 
compromised in the process. Those with money, social networks and political 
connections can speed up the process of gaining cards and securing their 
entitlements (Ibid.). Deshpande (2007), in constructing a Gender-Caste Development 
Index (GCDI), which quantifies intergroup disparity based on gender and caste, 
shows that for all Indian states, women in the OBC category are the best off, while 
SC-ST women are the worst off. The intersectionality emerges quite vividly in the 
qualitative data.  
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With the survey finding that over 98 per cent of households having some type of 
ration card, including FHHs, the above example of denial seems to be an exception. 
Outright denial has now been replaced by more subtle methods of discrimination 
relating to the type of card, the quality of services and the very nature of social 
interaction as discussed in the next section.  
 
Section 3: Markers of access: Insights from the Survey 
As noted in section 1.2, we examine access from the perspective of quality of services 
rendered, specifically in terms of entitlement snatching versus entitlement fetching 
and price magnification. For the statistical analysis, we create a metric that measures 
the wedge between per capita entitlement and the actual amount received. If the 
quantity received is lower than the entitlement, this would be tantamount to 
entitlement snatching. Effective price is the price paid weighted by the entitlement to 
accrual ration (details in appendix 1). We are particularly interested in the likelihood 
of FHH having greater incidence of snatching or price magnification.  Other things 
being equal, do FHH get lower quantity of grains relative to their entitlements?  
 
With cross-sectional data, we use a rich set of controls to minimize omitted variable 
bias. Several factors prevalent at the level of village have a relationship with 
snatching and price magnification. We thus control for village level factors by 
adding village dummies to the regressions. Table 3 presents the results for rice and 
wheat. In this analysis, it is important to control for varying entitlements, hence we 
include the nature of card held i.e. AAY card or PHH/NFSA card.  
 
The regressions interestingly reveal no significant difference in the quantity snatched 
based on gender. If anything, there is less snatching from FHH after controlling for 
other factors. The same is the case for the other measure of identity, that is, caste. The 
coefficients on the interactions between caste and gender are all insignificant, 
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pointing to no evidence of intersectionality. Yet what the qualitative data reveals is 
that the quantity of grains or level of prices are not necessarily the levers of 
discrimination across different identities; these are easier to spot and oppose. With 
low prices under NFSA, a one rupee or higher price is easily accepted unopposed. 
Rather there are sources of compromised access reflected in the quality of the grains 
disbursed to diverse types of households as well as the quality of services provided 
during delivery. Hence, while FHH do not seem to be disadvantaged in terms of 
quantity and price, there are less explicit sources of discrimination at play.  
 
Almost all the respondents complained about the inferior quality of rice provided. 
The elements of inferior quality included bad odour, bad taste, bad colour, mixing 
with stones and other elements, at times insects are also found in the grains. Some 
noted that the allotted rice is inedible and that they are forced to ultimately buy from 
the market. However, the major complaint by most of the women was that the dealer 
blended good and inferior quality rice together, despite their requests to give them 
separately. Back home women must work to sort and separate the grains, along with 
other household chores and care of children. This has led to women experiencing 
additional demands on their time, though this too varies by caste and class. We 
return to this in greater depth in the next section. 
 
Table 3: Entitlement snatching and effective prices 
VARIABLES Capita_Differ_Rice_PDS
_ 
Quanti 
Capita_Differ_Wheat_PDS_Quant
i 
Effective 
pricerice 
Effective 
price 
wheat 
          
Age -0.00155 0.00321 0.00401 0.00151 
 (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.00260
) 
(0.00139
) 
illiterate 0.332 0.244 -0.0571 -0.0544 
 (0.295) (0.290) (0.0706) (0.0374) 
FHH -0.587* -0.578* 0.0639 0.0650* 
 (0.300) (0.296) (0.0717) (0.0382) 
Number of 
months rice 
-0.0928 0.233* 0.0284 -0.0264 
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got 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.0437) (0.0237) 
Number of 
months 
wheat got 
0.0254 -0.160 0.0235 0.0242 
 (0.125) (0.123) (0.0349) (0.0214) 
Whether 
FPS within 
village  
-0.160 -0.418 0.00293 -0.00703 
 (0.628) (0.618) (0.152) (0.0805) 
Whether 
FPS has 
electronic 
weighing 
-0.143 -0.0333 -0.0538 0.0510 
 (0.447) (0.440) (0.121) (0.0657) 
Scheduled 
caste 
-0.343 -0.0876 -0.265* -0.154** 
 (0.765) (0.753) (0.147) (0.0776) 
Scheduled 
tribe 
-0.137 0.0925 -0.275 -0.140 
 (1.003) (0.987) (0.227) (0.122) 
Other 
backward 
caste 
-0.241 -0.0894 -0.352*** -0.190*** 
 (0.716) (0.704) (0.130) (0.0685) 
Minority 
status 
-0.496 -0.576 -0.325 -0.0900 
 (1.313) (1.292) (0.295) (0.155) 
Dummy for 
beneficiary 
knowledge 
on quantity 
entitlement  
-0.00700 -0.177 -0.154** -0.0749* 
 (0.332) (0.327) (0.0785) (0.0416) 
Knows about 
mandated 
price  
-0.567 -0.563 -0.0673 -0.0715* 
 (0.350) (0.345) (0.0801) (0.0425) 
BPL_card 
holder 
-0.705 -0.936 0.485** 0.192* 
 (1.551) (1.526) (0.205) (0.108) 
AAY_card 
holder 
0.554 1.117** 0.511*** 0.210*** 
 (0.468) (0.461) (0.0976) (0.0521) 
landholding 
size 
-0.120 -0.139* -0.0106 -0.00812 
 (0.0753) (0.0741) (0.00931
) 
(0.00510
) 
Whether 
mukhia & 
dealer from 
same caste 
-0.402 -0.522 -0.171 0.0257 
 (0.601) (0.591) (0.141) (0.0737) 
Ever had 
conflict with 
dealer 
-0.414 -0.242 0.116 0.0274 
 (0.381) (0.375) (0.0981) (0.0527) 
Whether 0.407 0.346 0.171** 0.119*** 
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dealer from 
same caste  
 (0.307) (0.302) (0.0704) (0.0374) 
Constant 4.164*** 3.374** 1.460*** 1.090*** 
 (1.361) (1.339) (0.348) (0.181) 
     
Observation
s 
457 457 837 811 
R-squared 0.153 0.192 0.220 0.243 
 
When examining the true gender effect in accessing PDS we need to move beyond a 
focus on FHH to an in-depth analysis of the pathways for differentiation, and family 
and community structures that might perpetuate inequalities for women in different 
social positions.  Results in table 3, for instance, show clearly the importance of 
landholdings in mitigating snatching. We also use non-food expenditure as a proxy 
for standard of living and a marker of economic strength. Richer households have 
higher non-food expenditure after controlling for other determinants of snatching.  
 
Given the deeply entrenched caste system in India, especially in a state like Bihar, 
surprisingly, outcomes for households who share the same caste group as the PDS 
dealer, that is, homophily with the dealer, does not seem to have a major impact on 
improving access or greater uptake from the PDS. If there is a status quo in incentive 
structures and the payoffs to the dealers are small,4 homophily does not seem to 
have an effect. In fact, the potential benefits of favoring one’s own caste is 
outweighed by the possibility of leaking grains to the open market as a dealer. 
Kumar and Somanathan (2016) confirm that though homophily works in large one-
time transfers such as government’s ﬂagship housing programme, the Indira Awas 
Yojana, it does not have the same results for “smaller” and “repeated transfer” 
systems like PDS for food.   
 
                                                     
4 Unlike the case of Chhattisgarh where the commission of the PDS dealer was raised manifold and 
resulted in reduced leakages (Krishnamurthy et al (2014).  
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Section 4: The workings of power: insights from the qualitative data 
Table 3 reveals a significant effect of holding particular types of cards. In this section, 
based on our qualitative insights, we discuss the differences between differently 
positioned women, especially SC women, in getting access to such cards. The nature 
of odds faced by these women would ultimately determine the level and quality of 
gender-justice in accessing the PDS.   
 
4.1 Local power politics 
The regression results (Table 3) point to the existence of significant village level 
factors affecting access outcomes. One needs to remember therefore that village level 
heterogeneity, including in gender relations, underscores the need for customized 
local solutions, if food entitlements have to be gender just.  
 
The interplay of caste, gender and class, alongside local politics and power relations, 
was clearly illustrated by the case of village A in Patna district.  This village is 
unique as there were de facto two Mukhiyas (headman): one incumbent Mukhiya 
(upper caste Bhumihar) who had been in this position for many years, and the other a 
proxy Mukhiya (of lower caste). The second was elected when the position was 
reserved for an SC candidate5. Having served as a bonded labourer in the upper 
caste Mukhiya’s house, he had no real power. His wife and his daughter too were 
engaged in the service of the Bhumihar (former) Mukhiya’s house.  
 
Low caste households then did not draw any benefit from homophily with the 
Mukhiya, even though the Bhumihars are a minority in the village, the majority being 
from the SC and OBC category. Despite the low numbers, the upper castes continued 
to wield power, manifested in the way that ration cards were used as a tool to garner 
votes during the election. An SC woman whose husband is a car driver in Patna 
                                                     
5 The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, 1992, ensured 33 per cent reservation for women, SCs and STs 
at all three tiers of local government, from the village panchayat to the district.  
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(nearby city), was denied the ration card, because, she believes, of her allegiance to 
the opposing upper caste Bhumihar household, who had contested and lost the 
Mukhiya election. With no work, she now helps in this household with domestic 
chores like washing, cleaning, and other menial jobs with a hope that whenever the 
man of this household wins the Mukhiya election, he will favour her. She complained 
that while she was denied the card, others, the “landed people” comprising mainly 
the upper caste Bhumihars have a card.  
As the village is divided in two factions, both led by Bhumihars, SC women 
maintained that the dealer belonging to their caste did not help them. Here, 
homophily by construction does not seem to matter as local politics and power 
relations play an overriding role. Any dealer, they allege, to continue in the 
dealership, must have the “blessings” of the upper caste Mukhiya. And this dealer is 
no different. They further added that, “Caste and gender of the dealer makes no 
difference. The Mukhiya rules the dealer. If the Mukhiya wants, even if you do not 
have a card, you will get the ration. He just needs to direct the dealer. He writes on a 
piece of paper and you can show that to the dealer, he will not deny you grains”. 
They also alleged that though the dealer does not overtly discriminate against them, 
during disbursement he is partial to the upper castes and those with social contacts.  
 
Earlier the present dealer’s father was the one distributing the grains. The PDS shop 
was in the lower caste hamlet. But being an alcoholic, he was irregular in 
distributing the grains. This resulted in fights at the PDS shop, when upper castes, 
who considered it below their dignity to stand in a line in a lower caste hamlet 
would break the line and take their share, while the lower castes would be left 
jostling for theirs. Once, losing patience, the PDS dealer was physically assaulted by 
the lower castes. The Mukhiya then decided to move the PDS shop near his house 
and run it under his supervision. Since then, the son of the dealer, who is pursuing 
higher studies in the city, took over the dealership. He got the dealer license, which 
was almost cancelled based on villagers’ complaints renewed. We were told that the 
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Bhumihar (who lost the election) in fact orchestrated the whole episode, instigating 
the villagers of his faction to file a written complaint. This was to teach the ruling 
Mukhiya, who was the patron of the dealer, a lesson.  
 
4.2 Clan (gotiya) matters more than caste  
 
Village B, also in Patna district, provides an interesting contrast.  Unlike the clear 
dominance of the Bhumihars in village A in determining the outcomes related to the 
PDS, a single caste group, the Yadavs, populates this village, with a few SC 
households. While classified as Other Backward Caste (OBC), the Yadavs are 
relatively well placed economically and politically. Considering the homogeneity of 
its population, one would expect the PDS to function well. In this case, both the 
dealer and the Mukhiya belonged to the same Yadav caste. However, the PDS 
functioning here was the worst of the villages in Patna district. Most respondents, 
except for a few households of the same clan, said that grains are disbursed for only 
about 8 months of the year, the rest is siphoned off by the dealer. The quantity and 
quality were always an issue, and the dealer would charge a higher price. When the 
women objected, he would retaliate by being abusive towards them, tear and throw 
away their cards, or if several protested jointly, he would simply close the shop and 
go away. 
 
Most respondents said that his behaviour was rude (dealer ka nature bahut kharab hai), 
disrespectful to women, and more so with lower caste women.  “If we protest, he 
calls us names, and says that I am a mad woman” (Janani pagal hai), said one woman 
respondent.  Most of them agreed that all dealers are the same, they are in touch 
with each other, call each other and set the rate of the grains (higher than the 
government price). “They cheat us with the quantity by making holes in the rice 
sacks (Boma maar dete hain), and the excuse they always give is that the sacks come 
like this, causing wastage during the loading and unloading of the grains”. 
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While a majority complained about the PDS dealer siphoning of grains, giving less 
quantity, and of inferior quality, among others, they also alleged that despite being 
of the same caste, he discriminates by giving preferential treatment to his relatives or 
the same clan (gotiye). As one woman observed, “It is very crowded at the PDS shop. 
On top of that, he will make us wait for three to four hours if his clan/gotra people 
come to collect their ration. One of the dealer’s relatives proudly confirmed, “We are 
the gotiye of the dealer. He ensures that we get the ration. He will call us and give if 
we do not turn up during the time he is disbursing”. Others also noted that apart 
from his gotiyas, to survive in this dealership, he keeps ‘important’ people, based on 
social standing, economic clout, and political connections, happy. 
 
4.3 Considerations of Status 
In Village C, women from the upper castes noted that, “Women from good families 
do not go to collect PDS grains, it is the men who go, and women from the lower 
castes”.  Yet, how the upper caste women access their PDS grains differed by village. 
While in village C the upper caste women thought it was below their dignity to go to 
the PDS shop, in village A, owing to their relatively low economic status, they did 
not shy away from doing so. Caste, gender and class all work together in this 
context.   
 
In fact, in village A, one of the upper caste women (economically better off than most 
of the lower caste households), who was very vocal about her right to the PDS 
grains, said:  “I get the right quantity. However crowded it may be during disbursement, I 
always choose the good quality rice sack. I pay Rupees 100 which is higher than the quota 
price but I do not mind”.  In this case, there was an implicit show of strength when she 
narrated how in earlier days she was on good terms with the current Mukhiya (of the 
same caste as hers) and how her son was his active supporter. Interestingly, the 
upper caste households do not use PDS grains for self-consumption since most have 
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access to their self-produced grains. The comparatively well-off households, even if 
they do not need PDS as much, make it a point to collect the grains since they have a 
ration card and believe it to be their right to get it (entitlement fetching). The PDS 
grains are either sold off (the money of which is in control of the women of the 
household who spend it on either jewellery or other needs), fed to the cattle or given 
away to the agricultural labourers who work on their fields in lieu of wage.  
 
 
There are instances as well where despite being of upper caste, being single, young 
and of low economic status, the experience of access is quite different for women. A 
woman in her late 20s (upper caste widow) with a 10-year-old son has never gone to 
the PDS shop. She sustains herself mostly by taking up small tailoring jobs that her 
neighbours get her. Being young and a widow, she feels vulnerable to villagers 
discussing her movement and interpreting her going out as transgression. This 
potential social stigma constrains her from accessing PDS grains. She sends her 10-
year-old son to fetch it. The position of women in the social and institutional milieu 
has a bearing on the difficulties they encounter in accessing their entitlements. In this 
case, despite being young and capable, the fear of social stigma restricted her access. 
 
Though we have broadly argued that homophily does not work, the social identity 
of the dealer worked to their advantage for some of the upper caste women. As 
explained by one of them, “He (dealer) cannot misbehave with us. He has the reverence 
considering that we are from the upper caste (Bhumihar caste specifically). The dealer takes 
extra care when we go to the PDS shop. He will not make us wait. He will let us choose the 
sack of rice that we want to pick”. Moreover, the location of the PDS shop too mattered. 
In the village A, the PDS shop was located near the Mukhiya’s house (upper caste).  
 
 
4.4 Poor delivery and the absence of redressal 
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While discussing the dealer’s son in village A, the women noted that though his 
behaviour is good, better than his father’s, he is entirely controlled by the Mukhiya. 
They felt that the Mukhiya in connivance with the dealer is interested in making 
profits. “He gives more to the upper castes, he gives them whatever they ask for. If 
we (women) protest, he says either take this or nothing at all”, said some of them. 
The usual complaints related to quantity, quality and measurement issues, though 
they were content with his regularity. They have to wait longer in line, for less 
quantity or inferior quality rice at a higher price. 
The women knew that as the Mukhiya is well connected, nothing will change even if 
they complained. Most were scared to complain because the Mukhiya would threaten 
to strike off their names from the list of ration cardholders. One of them recounted a 
case where, when she complained, the next she knew her ration was withdrawn. 
Most of the SC women observed, “if the dealer is of the same caste, they are more 
your enemy, as they exploit you even more. A Bhumihar dealer, however, will be no 
different, and the worst is we cannot say anything to the upper castes; at least with a 
lower caste we can fight”. With such entrenched power relations, the prospects for 
gender justice are bleak. 
 
What emerges is that the dealers let the upper castes choose the grains, give them an 
extra sack of grains if required, while amongst the lower castes, they favour those 
they view as potential trouble makers. Further, when the PDS shop is too crowded, 
the upper castes get priority and the SCs made to wait. The PDS shop remains open 
only for a day, and the date of distribution is not fixed. “We come to know of it by 
word of mouth or when we see people going to the shop.  During that time whoever 
comes gets the grain, if you miss that, you do not get it later”, said an SC woman. 
Since the PDS shop is now located near the Mukhiya's house, SC women restrain 
themselves from fighting there. When they leave the premises, however, they are 
vocal in abusing the dealer, some of them added in jest.  
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5. Conclusions:  
In this paper, we have focused on the experiences with the PDS in Bihar and 
examined the nature of food entitlements accessible to differently positioned people, 
in particular women. Our objective was to capture the nuances of gender 
justice/injustice in accessing PDS grains, by exploring both the quality of the 
entitlement and the nature of treatment meted out to the entitlement-holders.   
 
Since so much is invested in the ration cards of different forms, local power and 
political economy become very important in determining access through controlling 
these cards. Despite being a universal right, control over ration cards becomes a 
strong instrument for discriminating against women, the lower castes and the 
economically less powerful. While overt discrimination is less visible after the 
passage of the NFSA, quality is one instrument that can be more easily used for 
differentiation because of its intangibility and imperfect observability.  
 
Though we found limited evidence on direct entitlement snatching in terms of the 
quantity or price of grains, the qualitative data highlighted the locational 
heterogeneity in gendered access as well as the differentiation based on group 
identity. While caste is an important marker of social identity in India, some of the 
expected benefits of homophily do not exist. In fact, with their newfound power, the 
lower caste dealers end up being more aggressive in denying rights to their own 
caste groups. The quality of services is markedly inferior for the groups in focus 
here, revealing several latent methods through which discrimination is practiced, 
including lack of information, mixing of inferior grains, longer waiting time and 
even verbal abuse. These mechanisms impinge negatively on gender justice by not 
just devaluing women’s work and time, but also compromising their dignity as 
rights-holders.  
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Despite equal and universal entitlements, achieving gender justice in access to food 
through state transfers will require further shifts in power relations, in name but also 
in practice. It would involve challenging, renegotiating and transforming unequal 
social relationships, and institutional structures and norms that perpetuate such 
inequalities. Apart from improving access to information, monitoring and redressal 
systems need to be strengthened in order to overcome the near-total control of the 
local political elite, often the better-off, landowners and upper castes. While we have 
focused on community level parameters in this paper in discussing the delivery of 
entitlements by the state, we are likely to encounter similar issues of power in the 
realm of food production and absorption, albeit at different scales, from the global 
and national economy to the household. 
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Appendix 1: 
Effective price 
By law consumers have mandated prices. The survey data commonly shows price 
magnification where households are charged a little more than the legitimate price. 
The amount by which the beneficiaries have price magnification nominally is often 
identical across households. However, in quantity terms the extent of entitlement 
snatching varies quite significantly. Hence, we look at the price realization by 
developing the concept of effective price as defined below: 
𝐸𝑃𝑖 =
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖
∗ 𝑃𝑖 
Where 𝐸𝑃𝑖 is the effective price faced by household 𝑖. 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖 are 
the mandated and accrued quantities for household 𝑖.  With this definition greater is 
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the accrual relative to entitlement, lower is the effective price. Hence, even if two 
consumers face same price, effectively the households with greater degree of 
compromise of the entitlement effectively faces higher prices. This creates variation 
in the effective prices across beneficiaries.  
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